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Gaston: Contract Liability of Unauthorized Agent to Third Party in South

CONTRACT LIABILITY OF UNAUTHORIZED AGENT
TO THIRD PARTY IN SOUTH CAROLINA
It is generally well understood that one who purports to
contract as agent, but acts without the scope of his authority
(and therefore does not bind his principal), is liable to the
third party for the injury done thereby.1 The English case of
Smout v. Ilbe?j 2 states three general situations in which
the agent would be held liable:
[1] In the case of a fraudulent misrepresentation of his
[2] Where
authority, with an intention to deceive ....
the Agent has no authority, and knows it, but nevertheless makes the contract as having such authority.
In that case on the plainest principles of justice hejs
liable .... [3] Where a party making the contract as agent
bon& fide believes that such authority is vested in him,
but has in fact no such authority, he is still personally
liable. In these cases, it is true, the agent is not actuated
by any fraudulent motives; nor has he made any statement which he knows to be untrue. But still his liability
depends on the same principles as before. It is a wrong,
differing only in degree, but not in its essence, from the
former case, to state as true what the individual making
such statement does not know to be true, even though
he does not know it to be false, but believes, without
sufficient grounds, that the statement will ultimately
turn out to be correct. And if that wrong produces
injury to a third person, who is wholly ignorant of the
grounds on which such belief of the supposed agent is
founded, and who has relied on the correctness of his
assertion, it is equally just that he who makes such
assertion should be personally liable for its consequencesR
1. 3 Au. JuR. Agency §298 (1962); see MECHEm., OuTiNES 01T
§322 (4th ed. 1952) ; PERSON, PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY §289 (1954).
2. Smout v. Ilbery, 10 Mees. & W. 1, 152 Eng. Rep. 357 (1842). A
wife whose husband had authorized her to purchase meat for the family
was held not to be liable for the cost of meat delivered to her by Plaintiff
between the time of her husband's death while upon an ocean voyage and
the time that news of his death reached her in England. She originally
had full authority to contract, and had done no wrong in representing
her authority as continuing. There was no omission, on her part, to state
any fact within her knowledge relating to her authority, the revocation
itself being by the act of God. The court held that the continuance of
the life of the principal was equally within the knowledge of both parties.
3. Id. at 360.
AGENCY
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Assuming that the agent is liable, what form should the
liability take? Three theories have been suggested by the
courts: (a) the agent is liable on the contract, (b) the agent
is liable for fraud and deceit, and (c) the agent is liable for
breach of warranty. The South Carolina view is that the
agent is liable on the contract.
The earlier rule laid down by many jurisdictions, including
South Carolina, was that one who contracted for another
without authority was himself liable on the contract. 4
In Miller v. Stock 5 Justice Harper, speaking for the S. C.
Supreme Court, said that "There is no doubt that if a party
takes up goods representing himself to be the agent, and
directing them to be charged to his principal, he will be liable
personally if, in truth, he was not authorized to take them as
agent." Two years later Lance v. Barre 7 was decided. In
that case an unauthorized agent had bought certain slaves,

some of which were unsound, taking a bill of sale for them
in the name of the principal and paying for them with the
principal's money. The principal had recovered damages
from the agent because of the unsoundness of the slaves. In
this suit brought by the agent against the third party vendor
it was held to be error to order judgment for the defendant
upon the production of the bill of sale to the original
principal, the Court again through Justice Harper stating
that the bill of sale was a nullity, and that the contract still
remained unimpaired as between the plaintiff (agent)
individually and the defendant (vendor). Thus, the unauthorized agent was able to avail himself of a contract made
outside the scope of his employment.
Then, in the case of Edings v. Brown s the Court held that
"All the authorities agree, that the measure of damages
must be the injury sustained, whether the action be in tort
or on the contract, and the conflict of authorities is resolved
4. Andrews & Co. v. Tedford, 37 Iowa 314 (1873); Hatch v.
Smith, 5 Mass. 42 (1809); Meech v. Smith, 7 Wend. 315 (N.Y. 1831);

Dusenbury v. Ellis, 3 Johns. Cas. 70, 51 Am. Dec. 144 (N.Y. 1802);

Bank of Hamburg v. Wray, 4 Strob. 87, 51 Amer. Dec. 659 (S.C. 1849);
Edings v. Brown, 1 Rich 255 (S.C. 1845); Lance v. Barrett, 1 Hill 204

(S.C. 1833); Miller v. Stock, 2 Bailey 163 (S.C. 1831); Rosendorf v.

Poling, 48 W. Va. 621, 37 S.E. 555 (1900).
5. 2 Bailey 163 (S.C. 1831).

6. Id. at 163.

7. 1 Hill 204 (S.C. 1833).

8. 1 Rich. 255 (S.C. 1845).
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into a question of the form of the action. An action on the
instrument affords the most direct and just measure of
compensation."0 (Emphasis added.) Four years later the
Court held that where an agent states as true that which he
does not know to be true, producing injury to a third person
who is ignorant of the grounds on which the belief of the
supposed agent is founded, then it is summum jus that the
agent who makes the assertions should be personally liable
for the consequences.' 0
The South Carolina Supreme Court seemed to base its
earlier decisions on those of New York and England." In
Dusenbury v. Ellis,'2 Dusenbury was being sued by Ellis on
a promissory note signed: "For Peter Sharpe, Gabriel
Dusenbury, attorney." The note was in the usual form.
Dusenbury contended that he was not liable, having signed
the note merely as attorney for Sharpe. But the letter of
attorney appeared to be nothing more than the power to
collect debts, and contained no authority to give notes, or
bind the principal in that way. "The only question then is,
whether Dusenbury was not personally responsible for his
own note. On this point we are of the opinion that if a
person under pretense of authority from another executes
a note in his name he is bound; and the name of a person
for whom he assumed to act will be rejected as surplusage.
The party who accepts a note under such mistake or imposition, ought to have the same remedy against the attorney,
who imposes on him, as he would have had against the pretended principal if he had been really bound."' 3 And in
Meech v. Smith,'4 where an agent contracted to haul goods
and his principals would not honor the contract, it was contended that, if liable, the agent must be charged in an action
on the case, but Chief Justice Savage was of the opinion that
such an action could not be maintained, his reason being
that there had been no tort committed. The transaction between the two parties was a contract, and such contract, be9. Id. at 258.
10. Bank of Hamburg v. Wray, 4 Strob. 87, 51 Am. Dec. 659 (S.C.
1849).
11. See dissent by Cockburn, C. J. in Collen v. Wright, 8 E. & B. 647,
120 Eng. Rep. 241 (1847) for discussion of early English law. Meech v.
Smith, 7 Wend. 315 (N.Y. 1831); Dusenbury v. Ellis, 3 Johns. 70, 51
Am. Dec. 144 (N.Y. 1802).
12. Supra note 11.
13. Dusenbury v. Ellis, 3 Johns. 70, 51 Am. Dec. 144, 146 (N.Y. 1802).
14. Supra note 11.
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ing valid at law, must be obligatory on someone, and the
agent having made the contract without authority from his
principals, they were not bound. It follows then that the
agent himself is bound, and therefore the action must be in
assumpsit.
After the opinion of Justice Wies was written in the Eng-

lish case of Collen v. Wright,15 in 1857, in favor of the warranty form of action, many jurisdictions in the United States
began to look more closely at the reasoning of their earlier
decisions. At least four jurisdictions which were early pro-

ponents of the theory of liability on the contract, Massachu-

setts, i6 Iowa, 17 New York,' 8 and West Virginia,19 repudiated,
overruled, or ignored their earlier decisions and later held
that liability did not rest on the contract. 20 It will be noted
that in Massachusetts the change from contract liability oc2
curred even before Collen v. Wright. '
15. Supra note 11.
16. Hatch v. Smith, 5 Mass. 42 (1809); Lewis v. Friend, 1 Dane Abr.
217 (Mass. 1790).
17. Andrews & Co. v. Tedford, 37 Iowa 314 (1873); Winter v. Hite, 3
Iowa 142 (1856).
18. Meech v. Smith, 7 Wend. 315 (N.Y. 1831).
19. Cobb v. Glenn Boom & Lumber Co., 57 W. Va. 49, 47 S.E. 1005
(1905) ; Curry v. Hale, 15 W. Va. 867 (1879).
20. Miller v. -Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 102 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa 1960).
"It is elementary that an agent who purports to enter into a contract for
a disclosed principal is not himself liable on the contract unless the terms
of the contract itself provide for such liability." Haupt v. Vint, 63 W.Va.
657, 70 S.E. 702 (1911). A person who signs the name of another to a
contract, as agent of the latter, without authority to do so, is not personally liable on the contract as promisor or covenantor, but is liable in
an action of assumpsit, upon the implied warranty of his authority, or
in trespass on the case, for fraud and deceit.
21. Ballou v. Talbot, 16 Mass. 460 (1820). "The question in this case
is not whether the defendant is liable for having undertaken to make the
promise for Perry, but whether the note declared on is the note of the
defendant. It is obvious, from the signature, that it was neither given nor
received as the defendant's note. It is found by the jury, that he had
no authority to sign it for Perry, but the legal inference from this fact
is, not that it became his promise directly, but that he is answerable in
damages for acting without authority. What is stated in the case of
Long v. Colburn, as an intimation of the Court, was undoubtedly a
settled opinion, viz., that, in such case, a special action upon the case
would be the proper action. One way, and perhaps the best way, to
ascertain whether a party is sued in the right form of action, is to see
of what fact the declaration gives him notice, and whether that constitutes substantially the contract to which he is called to answer. In
the case before us, the defendant is charged with having made a promissory note to the plaintiff. The evidence produced is apparently the note
of another. But he wrongfully made this note for the other. This is
entirely new ground, of which the declaration gave him no notice, and
which he cannot be expected to be prepared to answer. Besides, if the
note i: to be considered as evidence of the defendant's own promise, he
must pay according to the tenor of it; whereas, if he were sued for
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In White v. Madison22 the New York court reasoned that
to hold the agent directly liable would often put the courts into
a position of making contracts for the parties which were
not intended, and contracts which neither party would have
consented to make. But even though these later New York
cases have held that the agent is not liable on the contract,
23
and is liable instead on an implied warranty of authority,
some of the inferior courts in New York have apparently
24
overlooked or ignored this change.
The landmark case of Collen v. Wright25 started a great
stampede in this area of the law, and after the dust had
cleared it was discovered that only a few jurisdictions-South
Carolina and Alabama as two examples-remained in favor
of the contract theory of liability. These two states seemingly let their tenacity rest on the principles of stare decisis, 2 6
falsely assuming an authority, he might defend himself by showing that
the person, for whom he assumed to act, had afterwards ratified his act,
or that he had otherwise satisfied the debt for which the note was given,
or, perhaps, he might show that no debt was due for which the note was
given, or that he had authority to make it. It is, in short, a proper
subject for a special action, in which damages will be recovered according
to the injury sustained." See also Mendelsohm v. Holton, 149 N.E. 38
(Mass. 1925); Jefts v. York, 64 Mass. 392, 50 Am. Dec. 791 (1852);
Salem Mill Dam Corp. v. Roper, 26 Mass. 187 (1830); Abbey v. Chase,
6 Cush. 54 (Mass. 1850).
22. 26 N.Y. (12 Smith) 117 (1862).
23. Taylor v. Nostrand, 134 N.Y. 108, 31 N.E. 246 (1892); see also
Dung v. Parker, 52 N.Y. 494 (1873).
24. Annot., 42 A.L.R. 1310 (1926).
25. 8 E. & B. 647, 120 Eng. Rep. 241 (1857), "I am of opinion that a
person who induces another to contract with him as the agent of a third
party by an unqualified assertion of his being authorized to act as such
agent, is answerable to the person who so contracts for any damages
which he may sustain by reason of the assertion of authority being
untrue. This is not the case of a bare misstatement by a person not
bound by any duty to give information. The fact that the professed
agent honestly thinks that he has authority affects the moral character
of his act; but his moral innocence, so far as the person whom he has
induced to contract is concerned, in no way aids such person or alleviates
the inconvenience and damage which he sustains. The obligation arising
in such a case is well expressed by saying that a person, professing to
contract as agent for another, impliedly, if not expressly, undertakes to
or promises the person who enters into such contract, upon the faith of the
professed agent being duly authorized, that the authority which he
professes to have does in point of fact exist. The fact of entering into
the transaction with the professed agent, as such, is good consideration
for the promise."
26. Gillis v. White, 106 So. 166 (Ala. 1925), "If the principal was
bound, as intended, the agent cannot be held liable on any principle of
law or justice. But if the agent, though assuming and intending to bind
a designated principal, and not himself, fails for want of authority to do
so, then the agent is himself liable on the contract as if he were nominally
a principal .... " (Citing Alabama cases.) "This form of liability seems
to be thoroughly established by our decisions though in most jurisdictions
such an assumption of agency gives rise only to an action for damages
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the South Carolina Supreme Court even going so far as to
2
say that a remedy in contract was the only remedy allowed. T
It does not appear that a single new member has joined
the camp of the pro-contract liability jurisdictions since the
1857 Collen v. Wright case, 28 but many jurisdictions have
since spoken out against the contract theory, declaring that

wherever the agent's liability may lie, it does not lie in contract.2 9
WHY NOT HAVE LIABILITY ON THE CONTRACT?

Why shouldn't the liability of the agent be on the contract?
Both parties meant to contract and had the necessary intent.
The contract was meant to bind someone, and if not the principal, then the agent-this was the reasoning of the early

New York cases and some of the jurisdictions which followed
New York's example. (South Carolina cases seemed to concentrate more on the relief granted than on the form in-

volved. 30 )
s Justice Selden
In the New York case of White v. Madison"
poses the problem of A (agent), without authority from P
(principal), giving a note payable at a very distant day to
X (a third party). Then X discovers that the acts of A are
unauthorized. Now, Justice Selden asks, should X be bound
as for breach of an implied covenant that the agent is duly authorized,

or as for deceit practiced by means of the false assumption of agency."

Medlin v. Ebenezer Methodist Church, 132 S.C. 498, 129 S.E. 830
(1925). "In view of the fact that the divergence of opinion relates simply
to the form of the remedy, conceding that the agent is liable, we prefer
to follow the rule laid down in our own cases of Edings v. Brown, 1
Rich. 255 (S.C. 1845); Bank of Hamburg v. Wray, 4 Strob. 87 (S.C.
1849); Lagrone v. Timmerman, 46 S.C. 372, 24 S.E. 290 [1895], which
hold the agent liable upon the contract."
27. Coral Gables, Inc. v. Palmetto Brick Co., 183 S.C. 478, 191 S.E.
337 (1937). "It therefore follows that in this state the remedy against
an agent acting ultra vires is on the contract, and this remedy is exclusive."

28. Abel, Some Spadework on the Implied Warranty of Authority,

48 W.Va.L.Q. 96, 112 (1942).
29. Fieschko v. Herlich, 177 N.E.2d 376 (Ill. 1961); Mueller v. Nugent,
187 Ky. 61, 218 S.W. 730 (1920); Gulf South Enterprises v. Delta Material Op. Co., 137 So.2d 427 (La. 1962); King v. Russell, 278 Mich. 529,
270 N.W. 775 (1936); Brawley v. Anderson, 80 Ohio App. 15, 74 N.E.2d
428 (1947); Hermann v. Clark, 108 Ore. 457, 219 Pac. 608 (1923); Roby
First State Bank v. Hilburn, 61 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1933); Forrest v.
Hawkins, 169 Va. 470, 194 S.E. 721 (1938) ; Haupt v. Vint, 68 W.Va. 657,
70 S.E. 702, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 518 (1911) (agent not liable on contract
unless it contains apt words to bind him personally).
30. Edings v. Brown, 1 Rich. 255 (S.C. 1845).
31. 26 N.Y. (12 Smith) 117 (1862), a case which occurred in the
middle of New York's about-face.
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to wait until the note becomes due and then sue A on the
note as his contract, or can X repudiate the contract and immediately sue A on the warranty of authority, implied in
the execution of the note. Since this was a "later" case the
New York court decided that it was the better view to allow
X to repudiate the primary contract and to prosecute on the
subordinate contract of implied warranty. (Perhaps the
court reasoned that if X were not allowed to sue now then
A may become judgment proof before X could bring an action on the original contract.)
But it would seem that X has suffered no injury up until
the time for the contract to be performed. To allow him
to sue immediately would place him in a better position, in
this respect, than if A had in fact been authorized.
Granted that A is not really an agent for this particular
unauthorized act, but by ratification the relation of principal
and agent is created and thus P would absolve A from any
liability to the P which would otherwise result,3 2 and would
also absolve A from any liability to X.33 To allow the third
party to sue before performance of the contract is due, as
suits brought under the theories of fraud and deceit or breach
of an implied warranty allow, would mean that the agent who
purposefully, or innocently, exceeded his authority could be
subjected to overhasty prosecution by the third party; while,
by proceeding more slowly, time and a possible ratification
may solve all problems without a lawsuit. Quaere: what
would the result be if the third party sued on an implied
breach of warranty and collected his judgment before performance was due on the contract, and then the principal
4
sought to ratify? Would the principal be allowed to ratify?
Should the principal be allowed to ratify and perform which
is what the third party sought to contract for to begin with?3 5
32. Hathaway v. First Nat. Bank, 134 U.S. 494, 33 L.Ed. 1004 (1890);
Strader v. Haley, 216 Minn. 315, 12 N.W.2d 608, 150 A.L.R. 970 (1943).
33. Restatement (Second), Agency §338 (1958); MECHEM, OUTLINES
or AGrNCY §§542, 1402 (1952); Savage v. Friedberg, 322 Mass. 321, 77
N.E.2d 213, 216 (1948); Hopkins v. Everly, 150 Pa. 117, 24 Atl. 624

(1892).

34. Apparently not. "If the third person has indicated withdrawal

from the transaction, as by instituting suit against the agent or by

setting up a defense based upon the agent's lack of authorization, a
subsequentaficeis inffective." (Emphasis added.) Restatement
(Second)Agny§2()88a(15.
35. Savage v.Friedberg, 322 Mass. 321, 77 N.E.2d 213 (1948), where
ratification occurred before suit was brought by the third party. The
court, allowing the ratification, states that "the plaintiff then got what
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What about the already-collected judgment against the agent?
These and other needless problems possibly could be avoided
by not allowing a premature suit to be brought.
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
As a general rule, the Statute of Limitations begins to run
when the cause of action accrues. The question as to when
the period begins to run as against an action by one who has
relied on the misrepresentation of an agent, concerning his
authority to contract for another, of necessity must depend
on the form of remedy which is permitted the aggrieved
party.
Where the action is for deceit upon false representations
the period of the Statute begins to run from the discovery of
the fraud. 6 In Flack v. Haynie,' the defendant falsely represented that he had the authority to act for another in opening an account with the plaintiff in favor of a fourth person.
Under the agreement, the goods were to be paid for by the
principal at the end of the year, but later the principal notified the plaintiff that the defendant had no authority to bind
him. It was held that the Statute began to run against the
plaintiff's cause of action for misrepresentation of authority
at the time he was apprised of the defendant's want of authority.
But where the action lies upon a breach of warranty it
seems that a different rule applies. It has been held that the
cause of action accrued in this case, not at the time of misrepresentation, nor at the time of the discovery of the false
representation, but at the time the wrong to the injured party
was complete and he suffered actual damages,38 the court
stating in the Moore case that "The cause of action accrued
it had originally bargained for and what the defendant did caused no.

harm." It would seem that this same reasoning should be applied to

cases where there had already been a suit brought. After all, the third
party is obtaining what he sought. To allow the principal to ratify andT
thus perform what was sought by the third party and yet still permit
the judgment to stand would be a gross injustice. It would allow the
third party to have his cake and eat it too - an extreme example of
unjust enrichment.
36. Pierson v. Holdridge, 92 Kan. 365, 140 Pac. 1032 (1914); Flack v.
Haynie, 18 Tex. 468 (1857).
37. Supranote 36.
38. Moore v. Maddock, 251 N.Y. 420, 167 N.E. 572, 64 A.L.R. 1189
(1929); Kennedy v. Stonehouse, 13 N.D. 232, 100 N.W. 258, 3 Ann. Cas.
217 (1904) ; 3 Am. Jun. 2d Agency §341 (1962).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss4/8

8

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 15
Gaston: Contract Liability of Unauthorized Agent to Third Party in South

when the wrong to the plaintiff was complete, not, as in an
action for fraud, when the wrong was discovered."3 9
In South Carolina where the remedy appears to be exclusively upon the contract, 40 an action resting on breach of contract, other than for the recovery of realty, generally accrues
at the time the contract is broken, although substantial damages are not sustained until afterwards. Nominal damages
can be recovered immediately, and the Statute of Limitations
then begins to run; its operation is not delayed until substantial or consequential damages result. 41 Whether a suit for
'specific performance could be had against the unauthorized
agent in any jurisdiction is questionable, but if such a case
were allowed in South Carolina then the Statute of Limitations, §10-143 of the S.C. Code, would not be applicable. 42
It is well stated by Lord Redesdale, in Bend v. Hopkins,
I Sch. & Lef. 428, "The statute of limitations does not
apply in terms to proceedings in courts of Equity. It
applies to particular actions at common law, and limits
the time within which they shall be brought, according to
the nature of those actions, but it does not say there shall
43
be no recovery in any other mode of proceeding."
MEASURE OF DAMAGES
The measure of damages in a suit for breach of an implied
warranty is analytically very different from that applicable
were the principal bound by the contract and the third party
suing him for breach, though in practice the result is doubtless much the same in both instances. 44
In an action on an implied warranty... the action is
not on the contract purported to have been authorized,
but it is on the unauthorized conduct of the supposed
agent, who acted under claim of authority. The object
39. Moore v. Maddock, 251 N.Y. 420, 167 N.E. 572, 573 (1929).
40. Coral Gables, Inc. v. Palmetto Brick Co., 183 S.C. 478, 191 S.E.
237 (1937).
41. S.C. CODE §10-143 (1) (1962). Livingston v. Sims, 197 S.C. 458,
15 S.E.2d 770 (1941); Executors of Sinclair v. Bank of S. C., 2 Strob. L.
344, 126 Am. St. Rep. 944, 13 Ann. Cas. 692, 15 L.R.A.(N.S.) 156

(S.C. 1848).

42. Parrott v. Dickson, 151 S.C. 114, 148 S.E. 704 (1928) ; Fanning v.
Bogacki, 111 S.C. 376, 98 S.E. 137 (1917); Blackwell v. Ryan, 21 S.C.
124 (1883). §10-143 of the S.C. CODE applies only to actions at law and
has no application to suits in equity.
43. Smith v. Smith, McMull Eq. 126, 134 (S.C. 1841).
44. MECHEM, 0uTLiNEs Or AGENCY §331 (4th ed. 1952).
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is to recover damages for the actual losses sustained by
the plaintiff as the natural and proximate result of the
breach by the defendant of his implied warranty that he
was authorized to make the contract. Whether it be
ex contractu or ex delicto, the gist of the action is the
misrepresentation made by the defendant to the plaintiff's pecuniary injury; and the purpose of the action
is compensation. In such cases the rule of compensation
seeks to put the party misled back in to the condition in
which he was before he acted on the asserted authority
of the defendant to make a contract for another. Where
a misrepresentation has been relied on by the plaintiff
to his detriment the measure of recovery is not the difference between the plaintiff's pecuniary condition if the
representation had been true and his condition under the
actual facts, but rather the difference between what
the plaintiff had before he acted on the representation
45
and what he had afterward.

In Tedder v. Riggin4 the plaintiff brought suit for commissions which he would have made had the defendant agent
been authorized to contract with him for the sale of 52,000
acres of land at $1.25 per acre to a third party - defendant
supposedly being authorized by his principal to make such an
arrangement. It was held that the proximate results of the
misrepresentation for which recovery could be had were the
pecuniary losses actually sustained by the plaintiff by reason
of the misrepresentation and not the anticipated profits
which he expected to make. Had the plaintiff, in reliance
on the defendant's representation as to his authority, brought
a former suit against the principal to recover such commissions, and, upon failure of such suit been compelled to pay the
costs of the action, then these costs, including attorney's fees,
would have been allowed as special damages in a suit against
the defendant agent.4 7 These special damages must be
48
alleged.
In an action for deceit where the defendant had falsely
represented that he had authority from the owners to sell
45. Justice Whitfield speaking for the court in Tedder v. Riggin, 65
Fla. 153, 61 So. 244, 245 (1913).
46. 65 Fla. 153, 61 So. 244 (1913).
47. Groeltz v. Armstrong, 125 Iowa 39, 99 N.W. 128 (1904); White
v. Madison, 26 N.Y. 117 (1862); SEDaGwicK, DAMAGES §240 (1934).
48. Ibid.
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a certain tract of land, the plaintiff was also not allowed to
recover profits which he would have made had the transaction been completed, the reason given being that the plaintiff lost no bargain, and no profits because of the defendant's
alleged deceit, for he would not have had the same in the
absence of such deceit. The plaintiff had merely failed to
obtain the profits, and the court felt that such failure was
not due to the defendant's representations. The court reasoned that the plaintiff was not prevented by the defendant
from negotiating with the owners or some truly authorized
49
agent for the purchase of the property.
Sometimes the courts seem to have treated the implied
warranty theory as if it were a promise of indemnity for
damages caused by reliance upon the assertion of authority.50
A few states have even codified the amount of damages
allowed: "The detriment caused by the breach of a warranty
of an agent's authority is deemed to be the amount which
could have been recovered and collected from his principal
if the warranty had been complied with, and the reasonable
expenses of legal proceedings taken, in good faith, to enforce
(Emphasis
the act of the agent against his principal."'
added.)
52

In the English case In Re National Coffee Palace Co.
defendant brokers subscribed on behalf of a supposed client
for fifty shares in a new corporation. They were in fact
without authority and when the new corporation went bankrupt and was liquidated the liquidator was allowed to recover
the subscribed price of the shares from the defendants.
Brett, M. R., said that in various cases it had been decided
that the measure of damages was what the plaintiff actually
lost, and it does not depend upon the amount which would
have been awarded to the plaintiff in an action against the
alleged principal if the contract had been broken by him
because that may not be the amount actually lost. "We may
test it in this way. If the action were brought against the
principal because he had broken the contract, the amount
49. Flora v. Hoeft, 71 Colo. 273, 206 Pac. 381 (1922).
50. White v. Madison, 26 N.Y. 117 (1862); Taylor v. Nostrand, 134

N.Y. 108, 31 N.E. 246 (1892), for services rendered and disbursements
incurred, affirmed 12 N.Y.Supp. 180 (1890); Anderson v. Adams, 43
Ore. 62, 74 Pac. 215 (1903).
51. CAL. CIV. CODE §3318 (1949).
52. 24 Ch.D. 867 (1883).
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actually recovered would be quite different if he were
solvent and if he were insolvent; if he were solvent the plaintiff would recover the whole loss, if he were insolvent he
might not recover a shilling. Therefore, it is what the plaintiff actually lost, not what the verdict of a jury would have
given him, for the execution might have produced nothing."' a
This same reasoning was used in a later case where the court
allowed recovery against one who had bona fide mistaken his
authority in negotiating an insurance settlement with a
United States company, the court stating that it had no doubt
that payment would have been made without delay by the
United States insurance company had the agent in fact been
54
so authorized.
The South Carolina Supreme Court has held that the defendant agent is liable for such damages as flow from the act, and
that the measure of damages must be the injury sustained. 55
In discussing whether the form of action should be in tort or
in contract, Justice Frost, in Edings v. Brown-,' says that in
either form of action if the contract sued on is for payment of
money then the damages must be the sum stipulated, and if
the contract is for the performance of any other act then
compensation for the breach or neglect of the duty may as
fairly be decided in the one form as the other.
Since South Carolina holds the agent liable as if he himself
had made the contract, an unfortunate result could occur
where the agent has bona fide misrepresented his authority
and the supposed principal is in fact an insolvent. The third
party finds himself the beneficiary of quite a windfall in that
because of the unauthorized act he can now sue on the contract
against a solvent defendant and collect the judgment, whereas if the agent had in fact been authorized the third party,
after suing the principal, would find himself the holder of
an empty judgment. However, where both parties (the agent
and the third party) are innocent, the courts might say that
it is equitable to let liability fall on the one whose actions
made the loss possible - in this case the unfortunate agent.
A New York case ' proffers the Statute of Frauds question.
53. In Re National Coffee Palace Co., 24 Ch.D. 367, 372 (1883).

54. Meek v. Wendt & Co. [1888], 21 Q.B. 126.
55. Lagrone v. Timmerman, 46 S.C. 372, 24 S.E. 290 (1895); Edings

v. Brown, 1 Rich. 255 (S.C. 1845).
56. Supra note 55.

57. Dung v. Parker, 52 N.Y. 494 (1873).
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In that case the agent had made an unauthorized oral contract
for the two-year leasing of a store. The plaintiff had gone to
some expense in procuring fixtures to fit up the store. The
court, discussing both the implied warranty and the deceit
theories held that plaintiff was not injured by the representations of the defendant agent and could not maintain an action
because he was not damaged. Even if the agent had had
authority to make the contract, since it was by parol, it would
have conferred no right upon the plaintiff - being barred
by the Statute of Frauds. The court held that the plaintiff
had lost nothing for he would have gained nothing had the
representation been true. His expenses were his misfortune
but they did not furnish grounds for a suit. Contrary to the
opinion expressed in a preceding article on this subject,5 s it
would appear that in South Carolina the same result would be
reached. The agent, being personally liable on the contract,
should be able to raise the same defense of the Statute of
Frauds.
But what about situations where the principal is an infant
or a mental incompetent? 9 Since an agent does not necessarily guarantee that his principal has full contractual
capacity, any more than he warrants that his principal is
solvent, then in absence of misrepresentation, either tortious
or innocent, certain prerequisites must exist in order to hold
the authorized agent liable. It must appear that (1) the
agent knew or had reason to know of the principal's lack of
capacity, and (2) it must also appear that the third party had
no such knowledge.60 Unless these two requirements are met
the authorized agent will not be liable. Not so with the
unauthorized agent. While the Statute of Frauds is a defense
of the contract itself and follows the terms of the contract to
different parties, infancy and insanity are personal defenses
and attach to the party and not to the contract. It does not
seem that these defenses are transferable. Thus, the third
party who deals with the agent of an infant in South
Carolina, when such agent has exceeded the scope of his
58. Folk, Survey of South Carolina Law, Agency, 15 S.C.L.Rnv. 30,
34 (1963).
59. By the term "mental incompetent" it is meant a person who is in
fact non compos mentis, but one who has not been so adjudged by the
Court. MEOHEMI OUTLINES OF AGENCY §§20, 21 (4th ed. 1952); 3 AM.
Jun. 2d Agency §§9, 10, 12 (1962); Restatement (Second), Agency §20
(1958).
60. Restatement (Second), Agency §332; 3 Am. Ju. (2d) Agency
§296 (1962).
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authority in the execution of a contract, finds himself in a
very advantageous position. He can sue the agent directly
on the contract with damages based not on what was actually
lost (as is the case in a breach of implied warranty jurisdiction6 1 ) but based instead on the personal contract liability of
the agent.
CONCLUSION
The contract liability theory adhered to by South Carolina
courts is a very workable rule and extremely easy to apply.
It has been stated, concerning the use of the contract liability
theory, that "It is not worthwhile to be learned on very plain
matters. The cases show that if an agent goes beyond his
authority and employs a person, his principal is not bound,
and in such cases the agent is bound."6 2 This type reasoning6 3
and stare decisis 64 appear to form the basis for the South
Carolina decisions.
Contract Liability, as has been pointed out, metes out
justice as well as any other theory, except perhaps in the rare
instance where because of some defect in the principal insolvency, infancy, insanity - it places the third party in a
better position than he would have been had the agent in
fact been authorized.
ARTHUR LEE GASTON

61. Meek v. Wendt & Co. [18881 21 Q.B. 126; In Re National Coffee
Palace Co., 24 Ch.D. 367 (1883).
62. Layng v. Stewart, 1 Watts & S. 222 (Pa. 1841).

63. "An action on the instrument affords the most direct and just
measure of compensation." Edings v. Brown, 1 Rich. 255, 258 (S.C. 1845).
64. Medlin v. Ebenezer Methodist Church, 132 S.C. 498, 129 S.E. 830
(1925).
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